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“[The Ministry of Land and Resources] figures show China added 2.4 million hectares of
arable land between 1999 and 2006. Over the past seven years, the area of newly added
arable land has proved to be greater than the land made available for construction projects,
benefiting more than 12 million farmers.” (China Daily, June 22, 2007)
1 Introduction
In both developed and developing economies, the preservation and development of arable land
resources is a policy issue of prime importance. The debate brings together diverse interests
going from the driving forces of urban expansion on one hand, to proponents of the need for
self sufficiency in food production for example. The need for government policy interventions
is typically justified on the grounds of market failure, where market price of land fail to reflect
collective benefits associated with arable land preservation and development, including both
market and non-market services provided (Coase 1960, Gardner 1977, Lopez et al 1994). This
earlier literature presumes that property rights over land is privately held, and the need for
market-based government policies through taxes and subsidies, or explicit zoning legistlations,
for example, have been extensively studied based on this critical assumption.
An altogether different system of land resource stewardship applies in economies where
land is public property. The case of China is a prime example where urban land ownership
resides with the state,1 while rural and suburban land areas are owned by collectives (Lin
and Ho 2005). Subsequent to governance reforms in the 1990’s and the devolution of fiscal
responsibility and authorities (Qian and Roland 1998, Zhang and Zhou 1998 Lin and Liu 2001,
Jin, Qian and Weingast 2005), local governments have increasingly taken on the role of land
developers (Lichtenberg and Ding 2009), responsible both for the allocation and development
of arable land, as well as land conversion decisions (Bao et al. 2004). In terms of agency and
incentives, therefore, the analytics of the Chinese case requires a shift in focus from private
individuals and enterprises to local governments, and from market prices to the fiscal pressures
facing local governments.2
1Russia is another example where the public ownership of all farmland has been argued to be a main cause
of the slow pace of land reform (Swinnen 2002).
2Farmland protection programs that are guided by private ownership of land, the presence of market prices,
but uncertain values of amenities, for example, have been studied extensively. For a synthesis, see for example,
1
Importantly, the transfer of land allocation and land development authority to local
governments has the potential of introducing a brand new set of inter-jurisdictional strategic
considerations, hitherto under-appreciated in two areas of active research: fiscal federalism, and
land policy reforms in the face of forces driving urban expansion.3 Specifically, incentives that
guide inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile inputs made possible by fiscal decentralization
(Tiebout 1956, Stigler 1957) can spill over to affect land conversion and development decisions
at the jurisdictional level,4 as land resources are of course key to urban development and
to attract mobile capital (Zhang 2007). Meanwhile, centrally mandated land policy reforms
can impact the fiscal capabilities of local governments, by framing their incentives to allocate
existing land between agriculture or non-agriculture, and to invest in the enrichment of existing
land resources.
At least as first pass, the importance of these strategic considerations will depend largely
on two sets of issues. To start, in the face of footloose industries, how salient really is the
relationship between capital inflow and land conversion to non-agricultural uses? To this end,
evidence in Zhang, Mount and Boisvert (2004) reveals that upon controlling for other relevant
factors, arable area is indeed inversely related to the degree of industrialization in China at the
provincial level. Second, to what extent are local governments in fact incentivized to channel
socially excessive levels of local resources to favor non-agricultural as opposed to agricultural
production? In this regard, Huang, Lin and Rozelle (2002) shows that through government
procurement and a system of centrally mandated implicit taxes on agriculture and rebates
particularly for export industries, a total of 563 billion yuan was extracted from the agricultural
sector to support the nation’s development process in the period between 1978 - 1996. These
evidence point to the intimate relationship between urban land use and industrialization at
the local level, and the potential (local-level) perceived bias against agriculture that arise due
to a centrally mandated system of taxes and transfers.
Hellerstein et. al (2002). Our paper contributes by addresses the same objectives of farmland protection, in
a wholly different institution context with public land ownership, and state government stewardship of land
resources.
3Zhang, Mount and Boisvert (2004) presents evidence of strategic interaction in the form of a peer pressure
variable, significant only in the post-reform period, on provincial level arable land use.
4The literature on fiscal decentralization with footloose capital is longstanding. Some studies illustrate the
negative impact of the need to encourage capital inflow on local public good provision (Oates 2972, Zodrow
and Mieszkowski 1986, Keen and Marchard 1996), while others emphasize capital mobility as a discipline device
(Qian and Roland 1998, Montinola et al. 1995, and Obstfeld 1998) where sound policies are rewarded.
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Taken together, these observations make it all the more striking that between 1999 and
2006, the addition of new cultivated land in China reached a total of 3.5 million hectares – an
amount greater than land approved for use in construction projects, while during the same time
period, the total stock of arable land has declined from 129 million to 122 million hectares.
Table 1 illustrates. As shown, while land conversion has indeed contributed to the net decline in
the total stock of cultivated land in China, this contribution relative to total land loss has been
relatively minor, and never higher than 25% for each year between 1999 - 2006. Other sources of
land loss include ecological preservation, natural hazards, and agricultural reorganization. An
overwhelming majority of the additions to cultivated land due to land consolidation originates
from local governments. Between 2003 - 2006, for example, cultivated land addition due to
central government projects constituted only 15% (0.19 out of 1.27 million hectares) of the
total (China Land and Resources Yearbook 2004-2008). Without a deeper understanding of
the Chinese farmland preservation policy landscape, these observations may appear to run
contrary to expectations, particularly in view of the competition for mobile capital unleashed
subsequent to fiscal decentralization, and the aforementioned bias in favor of non-agricultural
production implicit in China’s system of procurement, taxes and rebates.
In this paper, we explore the economic rationale of Chinese farmland protection policies,
in the context of a generalized policy of land development allowance (tudi zhengli zhedi zhibiao)
that has so far received very little attention in economic analysis of farmland preservation and
land development. In doing so, we bring together three sets of contributing factors: (i) local
government as custodian of land allocation and the importance of land revenue as a source of
fiscal revenue at the local level, (ii) inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile capital inputs,
and (iii) incomplete fiscal decentralization characterized by imperfect revenue retention and
an implicit tax on agriculture.
2 Law of Land Administration and Farmland Protection in
China
We begin with a discussion of two central issues surrounding the incentives that govern farm-
land protection in China: (i) national legislation governing land use allocation, and (ii) the
role of land revenue in local public finance.
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The Law of Land Administration is the first piece of comprehensive land legislation en-
acted in China in 1986, and amended in 1998 with specific emphasis on farmland protection.
In compliance with the Constitution, the legislation is founded on the public ownership of land
either by the state or by collectives, a comprehensive system of land use control through cen-
trally mandated annual quotas that restricts the rate of land conversion, and the establishment
of a Department of Land Administration responsible for monitoring and investigation.
At the national level, land use allocation is governed by a comprehensive system of
land use planning quota authorized by the State Council. For the period 1997 - 2010, these
national level quotas are shown in Table 2. In principle, from mandates at the national level
to actual allocation at the township level, national quotas are supposed to translate to use
restrictions linked to specific plots and land use zones. However, a comparison between Tables
1 and 2 quickly reveals that already by 2002, the actual stock of cultivated land (126.85 million
hectares) is below the national quota of at least 128 million of cultivated land mandated for
2010.
In order to provide targeted measures to encourage the protection of cultivated land, the
legislation requires that the occupation of cultivated land for non-agricultural purposes should
be replaced by the addition of new cultivated land through land development via reclamation,
consolidation / rehabilitation. In addition, Article 18 of The Regulations on the Implementa-
tion of the Land Administration Law provided for the first time an official land development
allowance policy, by stipulating that:5
“People’s governments at all local levels should, pursuant to the comprehensive
land use planning, take measures to press ahead with land consolidation. Sixty
percent of the area of the newly-added cultivated land through land consolidation
can be used as compensation quotas for cultivated land occupied for construction.”
At the provincial level, similar policies have been put in place. In Zhejiang province, for
example, the 1998 Notice on Encouraging Rural Land Consolidation stipulates that 72% of
the total areas of added effective cultivation can be used for approved infrastructure, core
village, small town and industrial district.
5Also see Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC (2002) and Tong and Chen (2008) for an in-depth discussion of
China’s land administration policy at the national level, and Wang, Tao and Tong (2009) for an account from
a provincial perspective with specific reference to Zhejiang province.
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This land development allowance policy specifically aligns the amount of newly added
land for cultivation with the size of the land conversion quota applicable for any local level
government.6 As such, rather than traditional monetary incentives through taxes and subsidies,
the land development allowance policy provide in-kind benefits in the form of land conversion
quotas to reward farmland preservation activities at the local level.
The legislation also lays out clearly the terms under which local government can requi-
sition, transfer, or assign land use right. The expropriation of cultivated land over 35 hectares
for construction is subject to State Council review. Local governments are required to pay
compensation to former occupants at a rate 6 to 10 times the average annual output of the
expropriated land, in addition to a resettlement subsidy linked also to the value of output.7
Land use right can be transferred for commercial uses, and assignments should be subject to
market forces through bid tendering, auctions, or listings.
For a quantitative picture of the importance of land administration policy on provincial
public finance, we collected from China Land and Resources Yearbook (various issues) a list
of basic statistics for the period 1999 - 2006. We note first and foremost that land revenue is
a sizeable contributor to local extra-budgetary fiscal revenue. Revenue that local governments
collect from the leasing and the transfer of land use rights for non-agricultural purposes is
fully retained within the local government by law (Beijing Local Taxation Bureau 2003) as
part of extra-budgetary revenue.8 In Table 3, the importance respectively of extra-budgetary
revenue as a share of total local financial revenue, and the net revenue from land lease as a
share of total extra-budgetary revenue at the provincial level are shown. These shares vary
widely across provinces, but on average, net revenue from land leases makes up almost a third
of local extra-budgetary revenue at the provincial level. Meanwhile, extra-budgetary revenue
constitutes a substantial part of total provincial revenue, at close to 50% averaged across year
6By 2008, concerns regarding uncontrolled urban expansion has led to an official tightening of the regulation
prohibiting further increases in construction land, according to The Circular of Strictly Implementing the Laws
and Policies of Rural Collective Construction Land. The impact of this change is an important issue that
warrants future research.
7See Ding and Lichtenberg (2008) for empirical evidence demonstrating that local governments face significant
gains in revenue by diverting land from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.
8Extra-budgetary revenue is made up of a number of revenue items not included as part of provincial
budgetary revenue, and hence beyond the monitoring of the National People’s Congress. This includes revenues
and income of institutional and administrative units, specialized funds held by state-owned enterprizes, and fees
and incomes collected from local enterprises.
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and province.
Importantly, despite the absence of a land market, the net unit revenue from government
land lease, calculated as the per hectare net revenue collected from land lease at the provincial
level, show signs that market forces are indeed in play in the assignment of land use right by
local governments. To this end, Table 4 summarizes the average revenue from of land lease
in 31 provinces of China over the period 1998 - 2006. The same information is plotted in
Figure 1. As should be expected when market forces are in play, the price of land lease is
positively associated with the relative size of the secondary and tertiary sectors. To control
for other time varying factors that may have also contributed to the net unit revenue of land
lease at the provincial level, Table 5 shows the estimates from a random effect regression that
additionally controls for the share of the primary sector in GDP, the lagged value of GDP,
population density and a time trend. As shown, these estimates are statistically significant
and in accordance with expectation – the net unit revenue from of land lease rises with demand
side factors such as industrialization and population density, with a time trend that is likewise
positive and significant.9
These salient features of land resource governance and preservation in China will form
the building blocks of the model of land development allowance policy in what follows.
3 The Model
We begin with a familiar two-tiered (center-local) structure of governance that features two
characteristics (Oates 1972, Keen and Maurice 1996, Qian and Roland 1998): fiscal decentral-
ization with imperfect tax revenue retention, and inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile
capital. With incomplete fiscal decentralization, tax collected locally is only partially retained
within the province, and otherwise repatriated to the central government to finance the pro-
vision of a national public good. With inter-jurisdictional competition, production capacity
in each province depends critically on whether local governments can institute policies that
attract mobile capital.
To this setup, our model introduces three additional features: (i) a dualistic structure
9These results also complements Ding and Lichtenberg (2008), where it is shown that urban land generates
higher revenue than agricultural land in the eastern provinces of China.
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of production activities including both agriculture and non-agriculture in each province, (ii)
the possibility of costly conversion of agricultural land to augment non-agricultural production
capacities and to attract capital inflow; and furthermore (iii) the possibility of costly addition of
agricultural land through reclamation, consolidation and rehabilitation to augment agricultural
production capacities.
The model will be examined in light of three distinctive policy regimes: (i) the first best
regime representing the land development and land conversion choices of a benevolent central
government, (ii) a decentralized regime where land development and land conversion decisions
are made by local governments in the face of incomplete fiscal decentralization and competition
for capital, and finally (iii) a land development allowance policy regime in which the central
government set explicit guidelines linking land conversion quota to land development efforts
at the provincial level.
The Composition of Provincial Production Activities
Consider M otherwise identical provinces, i = 1, ...,M . Each province is comprised of two
types of production activities, referred to henceforth as agriculture (a) and non-agriculture (n).
Accounting for all other inputs and costs of production, land use in agriculture T ia ≥ 0 measured
in efficiency units generates value added A(T ia).
10 A(T ia) is taken to satisfy standard properties,
with A(0) = 0, and AT (T
i
a) > 0 and ATT (T
i
a) < 0. Non-agricultural land T
i
n and capital
input jointly enable non-agricultural production activities, generating value added N(Ki, T in).
N(Ki, T in) is strictly increasing and concave in both arguments, and NKT (K
i, T in) > 0.
All local governmental efforts (inclusive of land reclamation, land consolidation, and
land rehabilitation) in amassing new and enriching existing land resources for agricultural use
will be collectively referred to in what follows as land development tid. Let t
i
c denote the extent
of the conversion of agricultural land to support non-agricultural production. Furthermore, let
T¯a and T¯n be the initial stocks respectively of agricultural and non-agricultural land. We have
therefore
T in = T¯n + t
i
c
10See for example Fan and Zhang (2004) for a recent study on the empirical relationship between land use
and agricultural productivity.
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T ia = T¯a − tic + tid
Thus, tic reflects the net increase in non-agricultural land use, while t
i
d − tic reflects the net
increase in agricultural land use. Rearranging terms,
tic = T
i
n − T¯n (1)
tid = T
i
a − T¯a + tic
= T ia + T
i
n − T¯a − T¯n (2)
It follows that in order for total land use T ia+T
i
n to exceed the baseline level T¯a+ T¯n regardless
of how the allocation is split between agriculture and non-agriculture, land development is
indispensable tid ≥ 0.
We assume that the minimum cost schedule of land conversion γ = γ(tic) is strictly
increasing and convex in the scale of land conversion with γ(0).11 Similarly, assume that the
minimal cost schedule of land development δ = δ(tid) is strictly increasing and convex in the
scale of land development with δ(0) = 0. 12
Fiscal Decentralization, Local Revenue and Expenditure
Both local and central governments balance their own budgets. At the local level, sources of
revenue include (i) (distortionary) taxation of value added generated from production activities,
(ii) land lease fees on non-agricultural enterprises that obtain land use rights, and (iii) all other
sources of non-distortionary taxation levied in the province r¯i, or net transfers from the central
government R¯i, both of which will be taken henceforth as given exogenously.
With two sectors (agriculture and non-agriculture) generating value added, total tax
take at the local and the central levels depend on a variety of factors. First, the tax rate
τ on value added is mandated by the central government. For the case of China, since the
11We refer to γ as the minimum cost schedule to indicate that γ is the lowest cost required to increase
non-agricultural land use, given existing geography and spatial distribution of land use within a province. In
Lichtenberg and Ding (2009), for example, increasing and convex land conversion cost also captures market
driven compensation for land requisition. Other cost of land conversion can also include cost of resettlement,
and basic infrastructure including water, electricity, and transportation.
12There is an alternative interpretation of our specification of land development and land conversion costs –
investing in newly added land is less expensive in agriculture than in non-agriculture, due for example for the
additional need for infrastructure, amenities, services and access to markets required by the latter. As such the
marginal cost of an increase in T in, γt(t
i
c) + δt(t
i
d), is strictly higher than δt(t
i
d). To maintain consistency, we
will refer to γ as land conversion cost, and δ as land development cost throughout.
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Provisional Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Value Added Tax in 1994, τ stood
at 13% for agricultural products, while export producing private enterprises receive full rebate
on the value added tax so that τ is effectively zero (Su and Zhao 2004, Beijing Local Taxation
Bureau 2003). Furthermore, as emphasized in Qian and Roland (1998), foreign firms are able
to evade taxes in host countries by transfer pricing schemes. To highlight this dichotomy in
the tax treatment and tax take on agricultural and non-agricultural production activities, we
assume henceforth that the value added tax τ is strictly positive in agriculture and zero in
non-agriculture.13
As a second source of revenue, local government levies land lease fees on the transfer of
land use rights to non-agricultural enterprises.14 As discussed, the Law of Land Administration
of 1998 stipulates that these fees are expected to be market determined via bid tendering,
auctions or listing, and the evidence shown in Section 2 also concurs. Accordingly, we let land
lease fee per land unit be given by the marginal product NT (K
i, T in) in each province i. Total
revenue from the land lease in province i is thus NT (K
i, T in)T
i
n.
The assignment of tax revenue between the central government and the local governments
is taken to follow a simple guiding principle (Su and Zhao 2004, Beijing Local Taxation Bureau
2003) – taxes that involve national interest or the macro economy are assigned to the central
government (e.g. import tax); taxes pertaining to local economic activities come under the full
control of sub-national governments (e.g. local level land lease fees), while value added tax is
shared at a given rate determined by the central government. Accordingly, let ν be the share of
local value added tax revenue retained by the province, and 1− ν the share repatriated to the
central government. ν parameterizes the extent of fiscal decentralization with ν = 1 reflecting
full fiscal decentralization and full tax revenue retention within each province. According to
Beijing Local Taxation Bureau (2003), value added taxation revenue follows the sharing rule
of 75% for the central government and 25% for local governments, or ν = 0.25.
The revenue that a local government collects in province i is thus
Bi ≡ τνA(T ia) +NT (Ki, T in)T in + r¯i + R¯i
13It can be readily shown that our qualitative findings are robust to the introduction of a positive distortionary
tax on non-agriculture, provided that the forces of inter-jurisdictional competition for capital is sufficiently
intense.
14In agriculture, similar land use fees do not apply.
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while tax revenue of the central government include collections from all M provinces,
B ≡
M∑
i=1
τ(1− ν)A(T ia)−
M∑
i
R¯i.
Budget balance at the local level requires:
Bi = γ(tic) + δ(t
i
d). (3)
Budget balance at the central government level requires:
B = Z (4)
where Z is a public good at the national level.
Inter-regional Competition for Capital
Capital is mobile across provinces. The marginal returns to capital in province i is given
competitively by:
ri = NK(K
i, T in).
The nation-wide aggregate stock of capital is K¯. Arbitrage made possible by capital mobility
implies that returns to capital are equalized across provinces, and thus for all i,
ri = NK(K
i, T in) = r. (5)
Assume henceforth that each province takes the nation-wide returns to capital, r, as given.
Equation (5) illustrates the tight link between land allocated to non-agricultural uses in
province i, and the ability of province i to attract foreign capital. In particular, let
Ki(T in, r) = {Ki|NK(Ki, T in) = r}.
It is straightforward to check that an increase in T in encourages capital inflow sinceNKT (K
i, T in) >
0, with elasticity
η =
∂ logKi(T in, r)
∂ log T in
|rconst. = − T
i
nNKT (K
i, T in)
KiNKK(Ki, T in)
> 0.
Finally, the economy-wide returns to capital r implicitly solves the following equality, which
requires that the sum total
∑M
i=1K
i adds up to equal the size of the aggregate stock K¯,
M∑
i=1
Ki(T in, r) = K¯.
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Each local government takes the structure of production, the fiscal contract between the
provinces and the center, as well as the presence of inter-jurisdictional competition for capital
as given. The objective of each local government in i is to maximize the welfare function W i
in i,15 where
W i(tic, t
i
d) =
[
N(Ki(T in, r), T
i
n) + (1− τ)A(T ia)−NT (Ki, T in)T in − r¯i
]
+ U(Z) (6)
subject to the budget constraint in (3). The first expression in square brackets indicates
provincial level economic well-being, as given by the value added generated in i, A(T ia) +
N(Ki, T in), net of taxes and land lease fees τA(T
i
a) +NT (K
i, T in)T
i
n + r¯
i. U(Z) denotes citizen
benefits from a national level public good Z that the central government finances through
central government tax revenue. The objective function of the central government is W =∑M
i=1W
i.
3.1 Nation-wide First Best Allocation
We begin our analysis by setting out a first-best baseline. From (4), the central government
chooses capital allocation Ki, land use T in and T
i
a in each i, along with public good provision
Z to maximize W :
max
Ki,T in,T
i
a,Z
M∑
i=1
[
N(Ki, T in) + (1− τ)A(T ia)−NT (Ki, T in)T in − r¯i
]
+ U(Z) (7)
subject to the budget constraint that total (local plus central) government tax revenue equals
total expenditure:
M∑
i=1
Bi +B =
M∑
i=1
[γ(tic) + δ(t
i
d)] + Z (8)
and
∑M
i=1Ki = K¯. Let a superscript “o” denote these first-best outcomes. (7) and (8) together
implies that the central government’s maximization problem is simply:
max
Ki,T in,T
i
a,Z
M∑
i=1
[
N(Ki, T in) +A(T
i
a)− γ(tic)− δ(tid) + U(Z)
]
− Z. (9)
15The assumption of a benevolent state government is commonplace in the fiscal decentralization literature.
See for example Qian and Roland (1998) for an analysis which sheds light particularly on the Chinese decentral-
ization experience. Li (1998) furthermore argues that establishing a pro-reform, and pro-business reputation is
important for bureaucrats interested in a position in the local business community after leaving government.
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With M otherwise identical provinces,
Ko = K¯/M (10)
with symmetric allocation of K¯ across the M provinces. Public good provision equalizes the
marginal cost with marginal benefits aggregated across provinces:
1 = MU ′(Zo).
In addition, land development in each province equalizes the marginal gains in agricultural
value added and the marginal cost of land development:
∂W
∂T ia
≡W oa (T oa , T on) = AT (T oa )− δt(tod) = 0. (11)
Land conversion in a first-best equilibrium yields marginal gains in non-agricultural value added
at NT (K
o, T on). In terms of marginal costs, two forms are incurred, including first the direct
marginal cost of land conversion γt(t
o
c), in addition to the marginal cost of land development
δt(t
o
d) to replenish an otherwise declining usage of agricultural land T
i
a:
∂W
∂T in
≡W on(T oa , T on) = NT (Ko, T on)− γt(toc)− δt(tod) = 0. (12)
(11) and (12) jointly determine the first-best levels of land use respectively in a and
in n. Figure 2 illustrates. Schedule DoDo in Figure 2 traces the combinations of T ia and T
i
n
that equate the marginal benefits of land development to the corresponding marginal cost.
Note first of all that DoDo slopes downwards. Intuitively, an exogenous increase in land use
in non-agricultural production, all else constant, raises the marginal cost of additional land
development for agricultural uses by convexity of δ. This discourages land use in agriculture.
Schedule CoCo in Figure 2 in turn traces the combinations of T ia and T
i
n that equate
the marginal benefits of land conversion to the corresponding marginal cost. Note that CoCo
also slopes downwards. Intuitively, an exogenous increase in land use in agriculture, all else
constant, raises the marginal cost of additional land development for non-agricultural uses by
convexity of δ from (12). This discourages land use in non-agriculture.
The equilibrium land use allocation in the two sectors is given by the intersection of the
DoDo and the CoCo schedules.16 These findings establish a set of benchmarks, based on which
16From (11) and (12), the slope of DoDo is given by
∂T ia
∂T in
|D = (NTT − δtt − γtt)/δtt , and the slope of CoCo
is
∂T ia
∂T in
|C = −δtt/(ATT − δtt, and thus ∂T
i
a
∂T in
|D > ∂T
i
a
∂T in
|C as shown in Figure 2.
12
we will evaluate three additional policies regimes.
3.2 Incomplete Fiscal Decentralization and Inter-regional Competition for
Capital
Contrary to the first best outcome, Chinese provinces confront decentralized decision making
with incomplete revenue retention ν < 1, and inter-regional competition for capital (Ki(T in, r)).
As noted, each provincial government maximize the post-tax income generated in the province,
subject to a budget constraint in (3), taking as given the nation-wide returns to capital r. Using
(3) and (6), the problem of each provincial government i simplifies to:
max
T in,T
i
a
N(Ki(T in, r), T
i
n) + (1− τ(1− ν))A(T ia)− γ(tic)− δ(tid) + R¯i + U(Z) (13)
In a symmetric equilibrium, Ki, T in, T
i
c , and z
i are identical across regions. Let a superscript
“c” denote these outcomes with inter-regional competition for capital. We have
Ki = Kc = K¯/M (14)
so that the aggregate stock of capital K¯ is equally allocated once again across the M otherwise
identical provinces. Thus,
Kc = Ko.
Land development in each province equalizes the marginal gains in agricultural value added
and the marginal cost:
∂W i
∂T ia
≡W ia(T ca , T cn) = (1− τ(1− ν))AT (T ca)− δt(tcd) = 0 (15)
Comparing (11) with (15), where the latter exhibits incomplete revenue retention parameter-
ized by ν < 1, provincial government underestimates the marginal benefits of land development
relative to the first best regime. In Figure 3, the DiDi schedule reflects this difference by once
again tracing out the combinations of land use in a and n that maximizes provincial welfare,
indicating a scaling back of agricultural land use relative to the first best regime for all T in.
Now in sharp contrast to the case of agricultural land development, local government
over-estimates the marginal benefits net of marginal costs of land conversion:
∂W
∂T in
≡W in(T ca , T cn) = (1 + θ)NT (Kc, T cn)− γt(tcc)− δt(tcd) = 0. (16)
13
where
θ =
NKK
c
NTT cn
∂ logKi(T in, r)
∂ log T in
|rconst. = σK
σT
η > 0.
and σK = NK(K
c, T cn)K
c/N(Kc, T cn) and σT = NT (K
c, T cn)T
c
n/N(K
c, T cn) are the shares of
capital and land in non-agricultural production. θ thus captures both the sensitivity of capital
inflow Ki to land use in non-agriculture and the impact of capital inflow on non-agricultural
production. θ accordingly reflects the strength of the impact of inter-jurisdictional competition
for capital on land conversion incentives.
Now compare (12) and (16), competition for mobile capital effectively shifts the CC curve
outwards. As shown in Figure 3, the revised CiCi schedule along with the DiDi schedule
jointly determine the equilibrium land allocation decision of local governments. Incomplete
fiscal decentralization and competition for capital thus reinforce one another in augmenting
local officials’ incentives to increase land use in non-agriculture, at the expense of agricultural
production. We have:17
Proposition 1 With incomplete fiscal decentralization and inter-regional competition for cap-
ital, there is over-provision of non-agricultural land by local governments and underprovision
of agricultural land relative to the first best:
T in > T
o
n , T
i
a < T
o
a .
This is made possible by an increase in land conversion effort, but a decrease in overall land
development effort relative to the first best regime if local tax revenue retention is sufficiently
poor, or, with (1− ν) is sufficiently large:
tic > t
o
c , t
i
d < t
o
d.
Since T in = T¯n + t
i
c by definition, non-agricultural land use greater than the first best level
necessitates land conversion effort greater than the first best. Now, tia = T
i
a + T
i
n − T¯a − T¯n
and as such overall land development effort depends jointly on land allocation in both a and
n, which move in opposite direction relative to the first best allocation due respectively to
incomplete tax revenue retention, and competition for capital. If the former (tax retention)
effect dominate, agriculture suffers doubly due to land conversion, and an overall reduction in
land development effort.
17The Appendix contains a formal proof of each of the propositions below.
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3.3 Land Development Allowance
In order to prevent unchecked urban expansion and the decline in agricultural production
due to land conversion, there is a variety of policy options. At one extreme, a ban on land
conversion sets tic = 0. Meanwhile, a comprehensive system of agricultural land use quotas
with a ban on uncompensated land conversion requires that agricultural land use must never
be fall below a given quota, and as such every unit of land conversion must be compensated
by land development of at least the same scale. The Circular of Further Strengthening Land
Management and Cultivated Land Protection, jointly issued by the Chinese Communist Party
Central Committee and the State Council on April 15, 1997, is one such policy which specifies a
target of dynamic balance of total cultivated land. Yet another alternative policy puts checks
on land conversion by a policy of land development allowance, whereby expansion in non-
agricultural land use is allowable only as a fraction of newly added agricultural land. The Law of
Land Administration enacted in 1998 (Chapter 4, Article 18) officially sanctions the use of land
development allowance, where 60% of newly added agricultural land through land consolidation
can be used as compensation quotas for cultivated land occupied for construction.18
Each of these policy options are special cases of the following general formulation of a
land development allowance policy, which links allowable land conversion to land development
efforts. Formally, a land development allowance policy is a pair (ρ,∆), which requires that
land conversion in each province i be no greater than:
tic ≤ max{0, ρ(tid −∆)} (17)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] gives the size of land development allowance permitted as a fraction of total
land development. ∆ is a minimal land development quota, and land conversion is permitted
under this policy when land development exceeds ∆. This policy imposes a constraint on the
feasible land use choices in a and n facing each provincial government. The constraint is shown
in Figure 4 as the upward sloping schedule ∆∆. Anywhere along the schedule, the constraint
is just binding with tic = ρ(t
i
d −∆), or equivalently, T in ≤ T¯n + ρ(T ia − T¯a −∆)/(1− ρ). A ban
on land conversion is thus the simplest case where ρ = ∆ = 0, and ∆∆ is thus a horizontal
18At the provincial level, similar policies have been put into account. In Zhejiang province, the 1998 Notice
on Encouraging Rural Land Consolidation stipulates that 72% of the total areas of added effective cultivation
can be used for approved infrastructure, core village, small town and industrial district.
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schedule at T¯n.
Alternatively, a law that stipulates a dynamic balance in the stock of agricultural land
at no less than Tˆ ia requires that ρ = 1 and ∆ = Tˆ
i
a − T¯a ≥ T¯a ≥ 0 whenever ∆ ≥ 0. Once
the quota ∆v is reached, land conversion is now permissible so long as a “dynamic balance” in
T ia at the specified level Tˆ
i
a is maintained by compensating each unit of agricultural land loss
through land conversion by the the same degree of land development (ρ = 1).
More generally, varying ρ ∈ (0, 1) and ∆ ≤ 0 allows the central government to fine-tune
the land allowance policy. The question remains as to whether the policy can be designed to
exploit local government’s incentive for urban spatial expansion to benefit agricultural land
development more generally. To see this, consider once again the local government’ problem,
now augmented with a centrally mandated policy of land development allowance:
max
T in,T
i
a
N(Ki(T in, r), T
i
n) + (1− τ(1− ν))A(T ia)− γ(tic)− δ(tid) + R¯i + U(Z) (18)
subject to (17), or equivalently
T in ≤ T¯n +
ρ
1− ρ(T
i
a − T¯a −∆),
and
T ia + T
i
n ≥ T¯n + T¯a.
In a symmetric equilibrium, Ki, T ia and thus T
i
n continues to be identical across regions. Let a
superscript “r” denote these outcomes with land development allowance, fiscal decentralization,
and inter-regional competition for capital. We have
Ki = Kr = K¯/M. (19)
With land development allowance as given by (17), an increase in agricultural land use made
possible by land development additionally impact the ability of the local government to expand
non-agricultural land use, given ρ and ∆. At an interior equilibrium, we have
∂W i
∂T ia
≡ W ra (T ia) = 0 (20)
⇔ (1− ρ)[(1− τ(1− ν))AT (T ra )− δt(tra)] + ρ[(1 + θ)NT (Kr, T rn)− δt(tra)− γ(trc)] = 0
⇔ (1− ρ)W ia(T ra , T rn) + ρW in(T ra , T rn) = 0
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It follows that the marginal welfare impact of an increase in land use in agriculture is now a
weighted average of (i) the marginal welfare impact of an increase in T in, W
i
n(T
r
a , T
r
n) (ii) the
marginal welfare impact of an increase in T ia in the absence of the allowance policy, W
i
a(T
r
a , T
r
n).
Furthermore, as long as the land development allowance policy is binding (T rn < T
c
n), the
combinations of land use in a and n that satisfies (20) lies between CiCi and DiDi, as shown
in Figure 4 as RiRi.19 Note that RiRi tends to the CiCi schedule as ρ tends to 1, and DiDi
otherwise as ρ tends to 0. The intersection of the upward sloping land development allowance
constraint ∆∆, and the RiRi schedule gives the local government choice of land use in a and
n.
We now show that an appropriately designed land development allowance scheme can
replicate the first best outcome:
Proposition 2 A land development allowance policy (ρr,∆r) that replicates the first best land
allocation T oa and T
o
n takes the form:
ρr
1− ρr =
τ(1− ν)AT (T oa )
θNT (K¯/M, T on)
(21)
and
∆r = T oa − T¯a −
θNT (K¯/M), T
o
n
τ(1− ν)AT (T oa )
(T on − T¯n). (22)
The result is intriguing for it shows that a land development allowance policy can re-invigorate
rural land development efforts while reducing urban land use. From (21), and (22), the intuition
behind this result is as follows. Note that land development allowance ρr as displayed in (21)
essentially eliminates the disincentive for agricultural land development due to incomplete
fiscal decentralization τ(1− ν)AT by pairing it with the heightened incentive for urban spatial
expansion in the presence of mobile capital θNT . Next, by accordingly calibrating ∆
r based on
the first best land allocation and ρr,20 a appropriately designed land development allowance
policy can indeed replicate the first best outcome. Doing so increases land use in agriculture,
and tames excessive urban spatial expansion in each province. Furthermore, relative to the
decentralized outcomes (tcc, t
c
d), the land development allowance policy strictly increases the
19Suppose otherwise, it follows from (15) and (16) that either W ia(T
r
a , T
r
n) > 0 and W
i
n(T
r
a , T
r
n) > 0, or
W ia(T
r
a , T
r
n) < 0 and W
i
n(T
r
a , T
r
n) < 0, violating the first order condition in (20).
20The case where ∆r in (22) happens to be negative will be discussed in what follows in the context of a land
development allowance policy with earmarked subsidy instead of a land development quota.
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total land development for tod > t
c
d as shown in Proposition 1 as long as local tax revenue
retention is sufficiently poor. Jointly these findings are consistent with the experience of land
policy reform and the massive increase in land consolidation efforts in China as discussed
earlier.
Proposition 1 also provides clear guidance on the determinants of the size of the land
development allowance ρr, and the size of the quota ∆r. Specifically, upon an increase in the
extent of inter-jurisdictional competition for capital, due to an increase in the elasticity θ for
example, the land development allowance policy should be stricter requiring a reduction in ρ,
but simultaneously a relaxation of the agricultural land development quota through a reduction
in ∆. Meanwhile, a change in the fiscal contract, such as a reduction in ν that worsens local
tax revenue retention even more, should call for a increase in ρ to encourage local governments
to take advantage of the land development allowance policy, while at the same time increasing
the quota ∆i to ensure that the first best allocation can be reached.
Note furthermore that the land development allowance policy (ρr,∆r) is feasible only
if the land development quota ∆r = T oa − T¯a − θNT (K¯/M),T
o
n
τ(1−ν)AT (T oa ) (T
r
n − T¯n) is positive. A priori,
the expression in (22) can be positive or negative depending on the relative magnitude of the
first best allocations, and the marginal value added impact of land in the two sectors NT and
AT . Alternatively, therefore, consider a subsidized land development allowance policy (ρ, s).
Specifically, let s denote a subsidy transfer from the central government to province i for each
unit of land development carried out. The cost of land development in province i is thus
δ(tid) − stid. With a earmarked subsidy replacing the role of the land development quota, the
land development allowance policy restricts land conversion via the constraint: tic ≤ ρtid, or
T in ≤ T¯n + ρ(T ia − T¯a)/(1− ρ).
It can be shown that first best land allocation can be replicated here as well. Consider
once more the local government’ problem, now augmented with a centrally mandated policy
of land development allowance with earmarked subsidy:
max
T in,T
i
a
N(Ki(T in, r), T
i
n) + (1− τ(1− ν))A(T ia)− γ(tic)− δ(tid) + stid + R¯i + U(Z) (23)
subject to
T in ≤ T¯n +
ρ
1− ρ(T
i
a − T¯a),
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and
T ia + T
i
n ≥ T¯n + T¯a.
Let a superscript “s” denote these outcomes with subsidized land development allowance, fiscal
decentralization, and inter-regional competition for capital. We have
Ki = Ks = K¯/M. (24)
Furthermore, at an interior equilibrium,
∂W i
∂T ia
≡ W sa (T ia) = 0 (25)
⇔ (1− ρ)[(1− τ(1− ν))AT (T sa )− δt(tsa) + s] + ρ[(1 + θ)NT (Ks, T sn)
−δt(tsa)− γ(tsc) + s] = 0
⇔ (1− ρ)W ia(T sa , T sn) + ρW ic(T sa , T sn) + s = 0.
We have thus:
Proposition 3 A land development allowance policy with earmark subsidy (ρs, ss) that repli-
cates the first best land allocation T oa and T
o
n takes the form:
ρs
1− ρs =
T on − T¯n
T oa − T¯a
. (26)
and
ss = (1− ρs)τ(1− ν)AT (T oa )− ρsθNT (K¯/M, T on). (27)
Thus, the land development allowance policy requires an earmarked subsidy to achieve first-
best if the land development disincentives induced by incomplete fiscal decentralization (1−ν)
is sufficiently high. Alternatively, if competition for capital is sufficiently intense, the first best
replicating land development allowance policy can in fact be a source of central government
tax revenue for ss < 0 from (27).
4 Conclusion
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, we address the issue of land use alloca-
tion in economies where land ownership is public. Based on the salient features of the land
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administration and public finance policy landscape in China, we provide a model that brings
together two previously unrelated areas of active research: farmland preservation and fiscal
decentralization with competition for mobile capital inputs to examine the public economics of
land preservation policies in economies where land is public property. In doing so, the model
shows the economic rationale for inefficient land use allocation where local governments, as
opposed to private individuals, are in fact custodians of land administration and land use
allocation.
Second, we examine in this context the analytics of a land development allowance policy.
In particular, our results allow us to make sense of the empirical observations discussed in the
introduction, that socially excessive land conversion from agriculture to construction can occur
in tandem with aggressive land development efforts in rural areas, through a land adminis-
tration policy that explicitly links allowable land conversion quotas with land development
efforts.
Indeed, we show that the forces of urbanization if appropriately harnessed, can be di-
rected towards the re-invigoration of land development efforts in agriculture. It is shown that
an appropriately designed land development allowance policy can be put in place to replicate
nationally first-best land use allocation, in an economy where land use is otherwise exces-
sively tilted in favor of urban expansion, because of inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile
capital, and because of a tax schedule that favors one sector as opposed to another.
Future research in this area can exploit of recent changes in Chinese tax laws, for ex-
ample, which has completely eliminated agricultural taxation. Based on the model developed
in this paper, this change can be readily shown to alter the land use and land conversion
incentives of local governments.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: With incomplete fiscal decentralization and inter-regional compe-
tition for capital, the first order conditions facing a local government i are shown in (11) -
(12):
(1 + θ)NT (K
c, T cn)− γt(T cn − T¯n)− δt(T ca + T cn − T¯a − T¯n) = 0
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(1− τ(1− ν))AT (T ca)− δt(T ca + T cn − T¯a − T¯n) = 0.
Comparing the above with the first order conditions in the first best regime, the decisions of
local government coincide with that of the central government if and only if θ = 0, or equiva-
lently when local government disregards the role of urban land use in attracting mobile capita,
and 1 − ν = 0, or equivalently when there is full tax revenue retention of local tax revenue.
Put another way, the extent of deviation from first best with incomplete fiscal decentralization
and inter-regional competition for capital will depend on the size of θ and ν. More specifically,
from (15) - (16), we have(
(1 + θ)NTT − γtt − δtt −δtt
−δtt (1− τ(1− ν))ATT − δtt
)(
dT in
dT ia
)
=
(
−NTdθ
−τATdν
)
.
It follows straightforwardly that as stated in Proposition 1, with incomplete fiscal decentral-
ization 1 − ν > 0, and inter-regional competition for capital θ > 0, there is over-provision of
non-agricultural land relative to first best for:
∂T in
∂θ
=
−NT ((1− τ(1− ν))ATT − δtt)
D
> 0,
∂T in
∂(1− ν) =
δttτAT
D
> 0
where
D = [(1 + θ)NTT − γtt][(1− τ(1− ν))ATT − δtt]− δtt(1− τ(1− ν))ATT > 0.
Accordingly, there is also excessive land conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses
since tic = T
i
n − T¯n. Meanwhile, there is under-provision of agricultural land relative to first
best since:
∂T ia
∂θ
=
−NT δtt
D
< 0,
∂T ia
∂(1− ν) =
((1 + θ)NTT − γtt − δtt)τAT
D
< 0.
Since T ia and T
i
n respond in opposite directions to both θ and 1 − ν, land development effort
tia = T
i
a + T
i
n − T¯a − T¯n, which depends on the sum of these two effects, exhibits:
∂tia
∂θ
=
−NT (1− τ(1− ν))ATT
D
> 0,
∂tia
∂(1− ν) =
((1 + θ)NTT − γtt)τAT
D
< 0.
It follows that the net effect of fiscal decentralization 1− ν and inter-regional competition for
capital θ on land development is strictly negative if the latter effect dominates, or if (1− ν) is
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sufficiently large.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall from (11) - (12) that the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a first best outcome are
NT (K
o, T on)− γt(T on − T¯n)− δt(T oa + T on − T¯a − T¯n) = 0
AT (T
o
a )− δt(T oa + T on − T¯a − T¯n) = 0.
Meanwhile, the first order condition of a local government that internalizes the incentives
offered by the land development policy are as shown in (20):
(1− ρ)[(1− τ(1− ν))AT (T ra )− δt(tra)] + ρ[(1 + θ)NT (Kr, T rn)− δt(tra)− γ(trc)] = 0.
A land development allowance policy {ρr,∆r} that replicates the first best outcome sets T ra =
T oa , and T
r
n = T
o
n , and thus from (11) - (12) and (20),
−(1− ρr)τ(1− ν)AT (T ra ) + ρrθNT (Kr, T rn) = 0
⇔ ρ
r
1− ρr =
τ(1− ν)AT (T ra )
θNT (K¯/M, T rn)
=
τ(1− ν)AT (T oa )
θNT (K¯/M, T on)
since Kr = Ko = K/M . It follows furthermore from (17) that the corresponding minimal land
development quota is:
∆r = T oa − T¯a −
θNT (K¯/M), T
o
n
τ(1− ν)AT (T oa )
(T on − T¯n).
Proof of Proposition 3: From (25), the first order condition of a local government facing a
land development allowance policy with an earmarked subsidy is:
(1− ρ)[(1− τ(1− ν))AT (T sa )− δt(tsa) + s] + ρ[(1 + θ)NT (Ks, T sn)− δt(tsa)− γ(tsc) + s] = 0.
A land development allowance policy with earmarked subsidy {ρs, ss} that replicates the first
best outcome sets T sa = T
o
a , and T
s
n = T
o
n , and K
s = K/M . Thus from (11) - (12) and (25),
ss = (1− ρs)τ(1− ν)AT (T ra )− ρsθNT (Kr, T rn)
= (1− ρs)τ(1− ν)AT (T oa )− ρsθNT (K/M,T on). (28)
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From (17), with ∆i = 0, the implied land development allowance follows directly from first
best levels:
ρs
1− ρs =
T on − T¯n
T oa − T¯a
. (29)
Using (25) and (29), the corresponding earmarked subsidy can be written in terms only of first
best land allocation, θ and ν:
ss =
(T oa − T¯a)τ(1− ν)AoT − (T on − T¯n)θNoT
T oa − T¯a + T on − T¯n
,
where AoT = AT (T
o
a ) and N
o
T = NT (K
o, T on) evaluated at first best input allocations. It
follows that the land development earmark subsidy is strictly positive if revenue retention of
value added tax is sufficiently imperfect – (1 − ν) is large enough – and negative if inter-
jurisdictional competition generates land allocational distortions that are sufficiently acute –
θ is large enough.
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 Table 1: Additions and Losses in Cultivated Land in China, 1999 - 2006. (Million Hectares) 
 
Year 
Total Addition Total Loss 
Total Area of 
Cultivated Land (year 
end) Total 
Of which due to 
Land Development, 
Consolidation, and 
Reclamation 
Percentage due to 
Land Development, 
Consolidation and 
Reclamation 
Total  
Of which due to 
Conversion to 
Construction Land 
Percentage due to 
conversion to 
construction land 
1999 0.41 0.26 63.57% 0.85 0.21 24.39% 129.85 
2000 0.61 0.29 48.21% 1.57 0.16 10.42% 128.88 
2001 0.27 0.20 76.18% 0.90 0.16 18.32% 128.25 
2002 0.34 0.26 76.43% 2.04 0.20 9.69% 126.56 
2003 0.35 0.31 90.46% 2.90 0.23 7.95% 124.01 
2004 0.53 0.35 65.17% 1.49 0.29 19.81% 123.06 
2005 0.63 0.31 49.23% 0.99 0.21 21.54% 122.69 
2006 0.72 0.37 51.01% 1.03 0.26 25.18% 122.38 
1999-
2006 3.85 2.35 61.11% 11.76 1.73 14.71%   
Source: Authors Calculation based on China Land and Resources Yearbook (2000-2007) 
 
Table 2: Comprehensive Land Use Planning Quota (1997-2010). (Million Hectares) 
Use Category Area 
Reserved Cultivated Land ≥ 128.01 
Protected Prime Farmland ≥ 108.56 
Conversion from Cultivated to Construction Land ≤ 1.97 
Additions to Cultivated Land through Development, Consolidation and Reclamation ≥ 4.41 
Source: The Ministry of Land and Resources, Outline of National Comprehensive Land Use Planning 
(1997-2010), http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/ghjh/200710/t20071017_88615.htm 
 
Table 3: Land Revenue in Local Public Finance  (1998 - 2006) 
Variable Mean Std.Dev.
Share of Extra-budgetary Revenue in Local Revenue 0.497 0.211
Share of Land Revenue in Extra-budgetary Revenue 0.321 0.402
Area of State-Owned Land Lease (Hectares) 3946.10 5173.44
Source: Authors Calculation based on China Land and Resources Yearbook (1999 – 2007) and Finance Yearbook of China (1999 
– 2007) 
 
Table 4: Net Revenue from Land Lease and Provincial Economic Performance in 
China, 1998 - 2006.  
Province 
Government Revenue 
per Hectare (10000 
Yuan)
GDP per capita 
(Yuan)
Share of Secondary and 
Tertiary Sectors in GDP (%) 
Anhui 105.50 6743 78.56 
Beijing 574.61 30138 97.12 
Chongqing 132.76 8469 83.43 
Fujian 150.20 14063 85.27 
Gansu 40.32 7373 81.34 
Guangdong 131.09 16176 90.93 
Guangxi 67.31 6776 74.84 
Guizhou 122.54 5953 76.01 
Hainan 118.74 12781 63.58 
Hebei 115.12 10216 84.03 
Heilongjiang 124.49 10994 87.77 
Henan 97.36 7665 79.43 
Hubei 89.13 8830 83.97 
Hunan 92.78 7626 79.16 
Inner Mongolia 39.54 10928 78.62 
Jiangsu 165.75 15935 89.61 
 
 
 
Table 4 (cont’d): Net Revenue from Land Lease and Provincial Economic 
Performance in China, 1998 - 2006.  
Province 
Government Revenue 
per Hectare (10000 
Yuan)
GDP per capita 
(Yuan)
Share of Secondary and 
Tertiary Sectors in GDP (%) 
 
Jiangxi 131.44 7384 78.63 
Jilin 98.48 10147 79.31 
Liaoning 151.68 13646 88.70 
Ningxia 50.70 16106 84.11 
Qinghai 47.39 16706 86.11 
Shaanxi 74.43 7770 84.94 
Shandong 95.90 13067 86.77 
Shanghai 173.52 39999 98.47 
Shanxi 109.18 8572 90.78 
Sichuan 150.75 6663 77.87 
Tianjin 181.99 25165 95.99 
Tibet 101.55 30394 74.63 
Xinjiang 33.69 10793 79.13 
Yunnan 54.90 6608 79.01 
Zhejiang 136.12 18296 90.87 
Source: Authors Calculation based on China Land and Resources Yearbook (1999 – 2007) and China 
Statistical Yearbook (1999 – 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Results of Random Effects Estimation: Dep. Variable: Unit 
Revenue of Land Lease 1998 - 2006 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Share of Secondary and Tertiary Sectors 4.227 (1.914)
Lagged GDP -0.007 (0.003)
Population Density 0.089 (0.044)
Year 5.489 (2.617)
Intercept -11225.37 (5143.931)
N=278 
R-sq: within=0.0843 Number of Groups=31 
R-sq: between=0.2836 Wald chi2=33.24 
R-sq: overall=0.2129   Prob > chi2=0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a: Net Revenue from Land Lease and Provincial Economic Performance (1998 – 2006) 
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Figure 1b: Net Revenue from Land Lease and Provincial Economic Performance, excluding Beijing (1998 – 2006) 
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Figure 2. First Best Land Development 
and Land Conversion
nT
oD
oC
nT
aT
oD oC
aT

oT
Figure 3. Decentralized Land Development 
and Land Conversion
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Figure 4. Land Development Allowance Policy
)1/()( TTTT
nT
  aann
iD

iC iT

iR
nT
aT aT
iD iC

rT
 iR

